We build on existing literature and contemporary challenges to African development to assess the role of political stability in fighting corruption and boosting corruption-control in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. We postulate that on the one hand, an atmosphere of political instability should increase the confidence of impunity owing to less corruption-control. On the other hand, in the absence such impunity from corruption, political instability further fuels corruption. Our findings validate both hypotheses. Hence, contrary to a stream of the literature, we establish causal evidence of a positive (negative) nexus between political stability/no violence and corruption-control (corruption). The empirical evidence is based on Generalized Methods of Moments. The findings are robust to contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions.
Introduction
The April 2015 World Bank report on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has revealed that poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of most African countries. According to the narrative, about 45% of countries in the sub-Saharan African region are still substantially off-track from reaching the MDGs extreme poverty target of halving poverty by 2015 from 1990 (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2015) . Political instability and corruption have been documented to represent substantial challenges to lifting the continent from its poverty tragedy (Amavilah, 2015) .
In North Africa, the Arab Spring of 2011 is still exerting substantial negative externalities in terms of political instability and/or prospects for political instability. Consistent with and Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015) , recent evidence of these tendencies can be summarized in seven main points. First, in the post-Gaddafi era, Libya has become a failed state, characterized by complete societal breakdown and anarchy, with a plethora of rebel factions and two rival governments fighting desperately to dictate the law of the land. Second, the 2013
Westgate shopping mall and 2015 Garissa university killings in Kenya by Al-Shabab have shown that the Somali Al-Quaeda affiliated Al-Shabab can still inflict substantial political instability challenges in the sub-region. Third, in Tunisia, after the couple of political assassinations that have characterised the post-Arab Spring era, the newly democratically elected government is now facing a wave of attacks from Islamic fundamentalists, namely, the: Sousse and Bardo National Museum attacks in June and March 2015 respectively. Fourth, the Boko Haram of Nigeria is currently extending its sphere of violence to neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Niger and Chad. Fifth, in Burundi, a decision by President Pierre Nkurunziza to run for a third term in office has cast a shadow of political violence/instability across the country. Sixth, the South Sudanese political crisis and civil war which began in December 2013 has led to thousands of death and displaced hundreds of thousands of citizens in the country. Seven, the current political instability in the Central African Republic is not very different from experiences in the past, notably: (i) a plethora of failed coup d'états between 1996-2003 and (ii) and (iii) Nigeria's marred political transitions in 2008 and 2011. According to Asongu (2014a Asongu ( , p. 1569 , political strife has been the rule of the political game for decades in many African countries: Angola (1975 Angola ( -2002 Burundi (1993 Burundi ( -2005 ; Chad (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) ; Côte d'Ivoire (with a resurrected crisis in 2011 after the 1999 coup d'état and 2002-2007 civil war); Liberia (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) ; Sierra Leone (1991 Leone ( -2002 ; the Congo Democratic Republic; Somalia and Sudan (with carnages in Durfur). In summary, seven of the ten cases of total societal breakdown and chaos documented in contemporary development literature have been registered in Africa (with the exceptions of Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan), namely: Angola, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Zaire/Congo, Somalia, and Sudan (Asongu, 2014a) .
Corruption that is relatively high in the African continent has been documented to exert substantial negative effects on development outcomes. According to Kodila-Tedika (2012a) and Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2013) , the debates on the consequences of corruption have included:
(i) no impacts 1 , negative effects (Ugur & Dasgupta, 2011; Mo, 2001; Mauro, 1995) or positive impacts 2 on investment and economic prosperity; (ii) slight weak impact of corruption on economic growth via the investment channel (Mauro, 1997) ; (iii) negative effect in specifically investment-oriented lines of inquiry (Everhart et al., 2009; Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana, 2008; Aysan et al., 2007; Brunetti et al., 1998; Mauro, 1997) ; (iv) perilous effect of foreign investment (Wei, 2000a) and bank credit (Ahlin & Pang, 2008; Wei & Wu, 2001; Wei, 2000b) in studies focused on capital flows; (v) negative return (De la Croix & Delavallade, 2007; Haque & Kneller, 2008) and quality (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997) of public expenditure, particularly in general (Delavallade, 2006) and military (Gupta et al., 2001) expenditure and (vi) the depletion of governance income (Blackburn et al., 2008; Friedman et al., 2000; Ghura, 1998; Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997) .
Other studies on the effects of the corruption have included: (i) neutrals (You & Khagram, 2005) and pros 3 , in debates on the positive impact on poverty and inequality; (ii) the disincentives of the concern to education with respect to years of schooling (Mo, 2001) , rates of registrations (Mokaddem, 2010; Dreher & Herzfeld, 2005) and ambitions of pursuing education to the research and postgraduate levels (Kodila-Tedika, 2012b); (iii) negative influence on corporate 1 See Li et al. (2000) and Brunetti et al. (1998) . 2 Marginal positive impacts are characteristics of countries with substantial institutional deficiency (Méon & Weill, 2010; Aidt, 2009; Aidt et al., 2008; Houston, 2007) . 3 See, amongst others: Li et al. (2000) , Gymiah-Brempong (2002) , Gupta et al. (2002) , You and Khagram (2005) , Gyimah-Brempong et al. (2006) and Dincer and Gunalp (2008). productivity (De Rosa et al., 2010) and business climate (Dzhumashev, 2009 ); (iv) political violence (Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2004) ; (v) perilous consequences on trade (Abe & Wilson, 2008 ) and degradation of the environment (Smith et al., 2003; Welsch, 2004; Barbier, 2010) and (vi) solid linkages with shadow and underground economies (Friedman et al., 2000) and strong likelihood for conflicts and crimes (Azfar & Gurgur, 2004; Azfar, 2005; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2013 ,2016 . It is important to investigate these hypotheses because the findings of the underpinning papers partially motivating this study could have an important influence on policy decisions. The rest of the note is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and methodology. The empirical analysis is covered in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
Data and Methodology
We examine a panel of 53 African countries with annual data from World Bank development indicators for the period 1996-2010. The periodicity begins from 1996 because corruption, corruption-control and political stability indicators are only available from this period.
The scope of the African continent is consistent with the underlying study partially motivating this note (Kodila-Tedika & Bolito-Losembe, 2014). Political stability is measured with the political stability/non violence indicator from World Governance Indicators. The corruption and corruption-control indices that are employed as dependent variables are in accordance with the hypotheses stipulated in the introduction. We control for government expenditure, trade openness, GDP per capita growth, inflation and foreign direct investment (FDI). While the firstthree control variables have been adopted by Kodila-Tedika and Bolito-Losembe (2014), we have added the last-two for more subtlety in the analysis. Accordingly, the first specifications only involve the first-three while the last-two are included into the conditioning information set in the second specifications (see Table 1 ).
Before delving into the empirical specification, it is relevant to highlight the expected signs for the control variables. Government expenditure should increase corruption (Asongu & Jellal, 2013 , p. 2196 Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana, 2008) . Trade openness decreases corruption (Asongu, 2014b; Asongu, 2012 Asongu, , p. 2178 . Economic prosperity increases corruption (Asongu & Jellal, 2013 , p. 2196 Asongu, 2013a, p. 63) , decreases corruption-control (Asongu, 2013b, p. 44 ) and per capita economic prosperity also increases corruption (Asongu, 2013c, p. 16 ). The reverse effect is also true if: (i) the benefits of economic growth trickling-down through equitable distribution mechanisms eventually deter 'corruption for survival' and (ii) economic growth provides the much needed financial resources to implement control of corruption measures. From intuition, low inflation should be favorable to corruption-control while high inflation should not; essentially because in situations of soaring food prices, many citizens revert to corrupt means to make ends meet. Like trade openness, financial globalization (FDI) is also a powerful tool in the fight against corruption (Asongu, 2014b) . The definition of the variables, summary statistics and correlation analysis are presented in Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively.
In accordance with Asongu (2013d), we adopt a system Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) for three main reasons: it controls for the potential endogeneity in all the regressors 5 , mitigates potential biases of the difference estimator in small samples and, does not eliminate cross-country variations. Hence, we prefer the system GMM estimation (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) to the difference estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991) in accordance with Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4) . The two-step approach is preferred to the one-step because it controls for heteroscedasticity. Two tests are performed to assess the validity of the models. The Arellano and Bond autocorrelation (AR(2)) test and the Sargan overidentifying restrictions (OIR) test for the absence of autocorrelation and validity of instruments respectively. We control for time-effects and ensure that the instruments are less than the number of cross-sections in the specifications by using three-year non-overlapping intervals. Hence, the basic condition for using a GMM technique has been met: N>T (53>5). We do not provide the equations in levels and first difference: (i) for brevity and lack of space and (ii) because the GMM estimation technique is standard and well known. However, details of the specifications and equations are available upon request.
Empirical results
This section presents the findings of the two main hypotheses outlined in the introduction.
As shown in Table 1 below, but for a thin exception (second specification of corruption perception index), the models are overwhelmingly valid. This is essentially because the null hypotheses of the AR(2) and Sargan OIR tests are not rejected for the most part 6 . Contrary to the findings of the underlying paper, the two hypotheses are validated, notably: (1) political stability increases corruption-control and; (2) political stability mitigates corruption. In the interpretation of the incidence on corruption, note should be taken of the fact that the corruption perception index (CPI) which is our indicator for corruption is measured in decreasing order by Transparency International. Hence, high CPI values imply low levels of corruption. The significant control variable has the expected sign. Accordingly, trade openness is a good tool in the fight against corruption (Asongu, 2014b) .
Table 1: The effect of political stability on corruption and corruption-control Corruption Perception Index(Corruption) Corruption-Control
Corruption (-1) 0.655*** 0.445*** 0.793*** 0.533*** ------------(0.002) (0.0003) (0.004) (0.003) Corruption Control (-1) ------------0.967** 1.057*** 0.648** 0.620*** (0.013) (0.000) (0 
Robustness checks
In order to establish whether existing levels of corruption and corruption-control influence the effect of political stability on corruption and corruption-control respectively, we assess the impact of political stability throughout the conditional distributions of corruption and corruptioncontrol. For this purpose, we employ quantile regressions (QR) on corresponding data without non-overlapping intervals.
Panel A (B) of Table 2 shows findings on corruption (corruption-control). The purpose of including a lagged value of the independent variables in the right-hand-side by one year is to mitigate the implication of the biases associated with endogeneity (Mlachila et al., 2014, p. 21) .
For either panel, irrespective of contemporary or non-contemporary specifications, there are consistent threshold effects from political stability. A threshold effect in the context of noninteractive QR is established when estimates corresponding to the independent variable of interest consistently display significant: (i) increasing positive and/or decreasing negative magnitudes or (ii) decreasing positive and/or increasing negative magnitudes (Asongu, 2014c) .
The first (second) scenario denotes a positive (negative) threshold effect. From our analysis, the positive and negative scenarios are established with respect to corruption-control and corruption respectively.
Accordingly, given that higher CPI values denote lower levels of corruption, political stability decreases corruption with the decreasing magnitude highest in countries where initial corruption levels is least. Hence, it is reasonable to infer that the political stability estimates are consistently significant with decreasing (increasing) magnitudes throughout the conditional distributions of corruption (corruption-control). In other words, the positive responsiveness of corruption-control to political stability is an increasing function of corruption-control while the negative responsiveness of corruption to political stability is a decreasing function of corruption.
Simply put: a good turn deserves another. Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs. *,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Gov't: Government. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where corruption is highest or corruption-control is least.
Constant

Conclusion
We have built on existing literature and contemporary challenges to African development to assess the role of political stability in fighting corruption and boosting corruption-control in 53
African countries for the period 1996-2010. We have postulated that on the one hand, an atmosphere of political instability should increase the confidence of impunity owing to less corruption-control. On the other hand, in the absence such impunity from corruption, political instability further fuels corruption. Our findings have validated both hypotheses. Hence, contrary to a stream of the literature, we have established causal evidence of a positive (negative) nexus between political stability/no violence and corruption-control (corruption). 
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